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Had the abolitionists of the past, the likes of Abraham Lincoln or William Wilberforce, been 
able to see into the twenty-first century, what might have struck them as very strange was that 
while we had come far in ending slavery and suppressing human exploitation, we seemed to 
have lost sight of what the term “slavery” means. This, despite the fact that for more than 
eighty-five years there has been a consensus in international law as to the legal definition of 
slavery. Likewise, despite this international legal consensus and the fact that most states have 
constitutional or legislative provisions prohibiting slavery in their domestic legal order, very 
little has been done to prosecute individuals for enslaving another person—until recently. 
A Neo-Abolitionist Era 
We say “until recently”, as it can be said that we are currently living through a “neo-
abolitionist era”, one that goes beyond its historical predecessor, which focused on ending 
legal slavery, to a contemporary movement meant to end slavery in fact. Distinctive parallels 
exist between the abolition of old and the current, neo-abolitionist, movement. Just as Quaker 
social activism and Anglican evangelicalism laid the foundation for the British abolitionist 
campaign, which ultimately led to the abolition of legal slavery, so, too, should we 
acknowledge the parallel roles of human rights activism (still including Quakers) on the one 
hand and the “Religious Right” in the United States on the other and their joint influence on 
Congress in passing the 2000 Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act.1 Similarly, 
just as its dominance of the seas during the nineteenth century allowed Britain to end the 
slave trade, so, too, has the current dominance of the United States allowed it, through 
legislation dealing with trafficking, to force other countries to get serious about prosecuting 
cases of slavery.2 
The dominant position which the United States holds in both soft and hard power has allowed 
it, through informal empire, to require states to pass legislation that criminalises the 
movement of persons through coercion, fraud, or deceit, with the intent of exploiting them. 
The most recent manifestation of the 2000 Victims of Trafficking Act, the William 
Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Re-authorization Act of 2008, makes it the policy 
of the United States not to provide non-humanitarian, non-trade related foreign assistance to 
any government that (1) does not comply with minimum standards for the elimination of 




These minimum standards relate to legislating criminal liability for those involved in 
trafficking in persons and require that the state “should make serious and sustained efforts to 
eliminate severe forms of trafficking in persons”.3 Thus, in the case of trafficking, the United 
States is requiring other countries to go beyond legislation to actual suppression. 
Before continuing, it should be made plain that trafficking is not in itself slavery, but a 
process by which slavery can be achieved. However, the moves of the United States to 
suppress trafficking have a knock-on effect regarding slavery. This is so because the 
trafficking legislation which has emanated from the US Congress is modelled upon, and an 
offshoot of, the United Nations’ 2000 Palermo Protocol—the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress 
and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children. The Palermo Protocol, 
for its part, sets out a definition of trafficking that establishes a crime related to a chain of 
movement of a person into situations of “exploitation” as a result of violence or other means. 
The Palermo Protocol gives examples of the types of exploitation that are meant to be 
addressed. These include forced labour, servitude, and, most importantly for our 
consideration, slavery.4 As a result, if countries are meant to suppress trafficking where it 
involves slavery, it is rather difficult to turn a blind eye to cases of slavery on their territory 
that do not involve trafficking, in the sense of this chain of movement. 
The other influence that the United States has had on the emergence of the neo-abolitionist 
era is rather more equivocal as it relates to the crime against humanity of enslavement within 
the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court. While the United States remains opposed 
to becoming party to the court, it has also utilised it instrumentally, allowing the UN Security 
Council to act against the leaderships of both Sudan and Libya. Where the international crime 
of enslavement is concerned, what places us on firmer ground with regard to US influence is 
Washington’s leading role in creating the ad hoc criminal tribunals for the former Yugoslavia 
and Rwanda, which acted as precursors, and thus cleared the way for the establishment, of the 
International Criminal Court.5 For many of the 120 states that have signed up to the 
International Criminal Court, doing so has meant the introduction of domestic legislation to 
ensure that the court can function in a complementary fashion within the domestic legal 
order. Part of that legislation inevitably addressed the crimes under the jurisdiction of the 
International Criminal Court, and a number of states, including Burundi, Malta, Niger and 
Romania, have incorporated “enslavement” into their domestic legislation. 
A Contested Term 
These are the dynamics at play that have brought slavery back into legal focus in the context 
of the early twenty-first century. Yet, today, the very term “slavery” and its contours are 
contested, even though an international definition of slavery was established in 1926, was 
confirmed in 1956, and was replicated in substance as the definition of enslavement included 
in the 1998 Statute of the International Criminal Court. However, it may also be said that the 
legal contours of slavery remain contested not necessarily despite the 1926 definition of 
slavery, but because of it. This is because the definition looks rather opaque at first glance: 
Slavery is the status or condition of a person over whom any or all of the powers 
attaching to the right of ownership are exercised. 
One’s immediate impression might be that of the importance of ownership—that a person 
must own another for slavery to be said to exist. But this is not so. 
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As the Australian equivalent of the US Supreme Court made clear in its 2008 Tang case, the 
1926 definition has contemporary relevance in situations where a person does not legally own 
another, as they did in days of old. What the High Court of Australia determined was that 
while the 1926 definition applied in de jure situations—that is, where a person legally owns 
another—it also applied in de facto situations where a person exercised the powers attaching 
to the right of ownership instead of exercising the right of ownership over a person. In other 
words, a person could be in a condition of slavery without legal ownership, if it could be 
shown that he or she was treated like a slave in fact, if not in law. Let us provide some 
examples to illuminate this de jure–de facto difference. 
Consider the case of a bigamist. In most countries, it is illegal for a married person to marry a 
second time. Let us say that a man gets married a second time. For that man, the second 
marriage is illegal, the courts will not recognise it; thus, he is not married de jure. However, 
from the courts’ perspective he is married de facto, which allows for the bigamy case to 
proceed. 
A further example brings us closer to a consideration of the essence of the definition of 
slavery. Consider the dispute between two drug dealers over a kilogram of heroin. While 
neither has a de jure right of ownership of the drugs, the courts will recognise the exercise of 
a power attaching to such a right of ownership in a de facto sense so as to hold one or the 
other in violation of the laws related to possessing controlled substances. This example is 
instructive as it functions within a property-law paradigm that is also applicable in cases of 
contemporary slavery. While the judge could make a determination of de facto ownership if a 
drug dealer was caught selling heroin, typically such cases are resolved on the simple issue of 
possession: did the individual have control over the heroin, did she possess it? 
In the case of slavery the element of possession is fundamental. It allows us to drain the 
swamp and leave the definitional quagmire which has marginalised the legal definition of 
slavery. The definition has been often bogged down, since at least the 1930s, by individuals 
and organisations trying to expand the notion of slavery to fit their agenda and thus benefit 
from the visceral power of the claim that what they are railing against is “slavery”. Consider, 
for instance, attempts within the United Nations during the 1960s to equate colonialism and 
apartheid to slavery; or UN studies in the 1990s that considered incest and juvenile detention 
under the heading of contemporary forms of slavery. 
A Sociological Reading 
With the legal definition of slavery marginalised, people looked elsewhere to define slavery. 
A survey of the academic literature on contemporary slavery—including much of the legal 
literature on the subject—would show that, in the main, it has turned to the work of Kevin 
Bales and his sociological reading of what constitutes slavery. For more than fifteen years, 
Bales has attempted to build discussions on contemporary slavery and propose an agenda for 
both research and effective intervention.6 In essence, Bales’s definition turns on the following 
elements: the use of violence, and the ability to control, for economic exploitation.7 The 
primary indicator of slavery is that of control—control that diminishes the agency of the 
slave, normally demonstrated by the physical control of the slave that prevents escape from 
enslavement and forces him or her to work. The primacy of control is often additionally 




Bales also argues that slavery as a status or condition is not defined by the customs, practices, 
methods, or mechanisms of enslavement. A person might be taken into slavery by many 
paths, but the means of enslavement, the vehicle by which a person arrives in the state or 
condition of slavery, while important for understanding the nature of a particular case, does 
not determine that state; it is simply the means by which a person arrives under the control of 
another. 
A number of examples help to shed light on this last distinction and clear up the confusion 
arising from disparate definitions based on pathways to enslavement as opposed to the 
condition of slavery itself. Imagine there are four women, all of whom are experiencing the 
following conditions: all four women are held under the physical control of another person 
against their will; this control prevents them from exercising agency or leaving the place 
where they are held; the activities of each woman are managed by the person in control, and 
each is required to undertake activities that benefit the person who controls her; the control is 
such that any of the women can be transferred to another individual against her will, or 
destroyed by the person who controls her; each women experiences intermittent rape at the 
hands of the person controlling her, as well as by other men as allowed by the person who 
controls her. 
What is telling is that while few would disagree that these four women are enslaved based on 
this description, some commentators would argue that some of these women are not in 
slavery when the means by which they were enslaved are introduced. Now let us assume that 
the first woman arrived at this condition after being falsely arrested, “fined”, and then handed 
over to the person who controls her to “work off her fine” in an open-pit mine in eastern 
Congo. The second woman, seeking a better life, paid a smuggler to help her enter another 
country and upon arrival was handed over to, and then sexually assaulted by, the person who 
would control her. The controller also told her that she owed a sum of money in addition to 
what she paid to be smuggled. The woman was then placed in a brothel in the United States 
owned by the person controlling her where she was sold for sex. The third woman arrived in 
the condition of control when her husband took out a loan and placed himself and his family 
as collateral against that loan. The family continued the agricultural work in India they had 
previously performed but which now profited the person who controlled them. The fourth 
woman entered this situation as a child when her parents were offered the opportunity of a 
“placement”, a sort of apprenticeship, for their child in the family of the person who would 
come to control her in Haiti. 
There are proponents of specific definitions of slavery that rely on reference to mechanisms 
of acquisition or to cultural context who would deny these women are enslaved. And yet 
there are three important points to make about these four women: (1) these are not 
hypothetical examples—all of these are real women, living today;8 (2) most would recognise 
the situations of each of these women to constitute slavery; (3) the path or mechanism by 
which they arrived at this condition is important in understanding their situation but is not 
relevant in the determination of whether they are slaves. 
This last point is especially important. For example, in the case of the first woman, some 
academic commentators, as well as members of local power elites, and specifically the 
leaders of the rebel groups illegally operating the mines of eastern Congo and exercising 
control over the first woman as slaveholders, would argue that she is not enslaved but simply 
in a situation of peonage, a legitimate exercise of legal control over miscreants. In the case of 
the second woman, some commentators, and typically criminals who engage in human 
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trafficking for commercial sexual exploitation, would argue she was not in slavery because 
she was in a situation of debt obligation; other commentators would argue that she was not a 
slave but a sex-trafficking victim. In the case of the third woman, some commentators, and 
typically the slave-masters of India, would argue that she was not in slavery because this 
form of hereditary debt bondage is not slavery but a traditional contracting of obligated 
labour. And some commentators, and typically the adults in the households exploiting her 
labour and using her sexually, would argue that the fourth woman was not in slavery because 
she was in fact benefiting from a traditional practice of placement that allows the poor access 
to alternative ladders of opportunity. 
Put simply, it is illogical to name the mechanism of acquisition of a person as an essential 
component in defining whether a person is in slavery. Slavery is a status or condition, not the 
means by which a person is removed into that state or condition of control. 
Possession and Control 
However, for most academics and practitioners, turning to Bales’s sociological definition of 
slavery leaves us with a dilemma: on the one hand, it provides us with the nearest 
approximation to the lived experience of a slave today, serves well as a methodological tool 
supporting predictive validity in the social-scientific study of slavery, but is not legally 
binding; on the other, the failure to engage with the legal definition has made it redundant as 
an anti-slavery tool within the rule of law. 
We believe that there is a way out of the dilemma; and it is here that our earlier discussion of 
possession comes into play. It was not realised until recently, when property lawyers sat 
down with slavery experts—both historians and contemporary scholars—that not only could 
the 1926 definition be read in a manner consistent with what would be considered in social-
scientific terms as slavery, but that such a reading was, in fact and in law, internally 
consistent with a reading of the legal definition.9 
That reading turns on the understanding that possession is about control, which is very much 
the orthodoxy in property law. In a seminal article, now more than fifty years old, Antony 
Honoré wrote that possession is “the foundation on which the whole superstructure of 
ownership rests”.10 Thus, when considering the 1926 legal definition of slavery and seeking 
to apply it to a contemporary case, one should look for the exercise of control over a person 
tantamount to possession. Possession is the sine qua non of slavery—it is, as in the case of 
illegal drugs, what judges and prosecutors should focus upon. Why? Because possession is 
the most important of the—in the language of the 1926 definition—powers attaching to the 
right of ownership. This is so as the other powers do not catch the essence of slavery unless 
control tantamount to possession is present. 
In the language of property lawyers, ownership entails a number of rights. Thus, there “is the 
right to walk about the field, to till it, to allow others to till it … to sell it … to give it away … 
and so forth”.11 Yet, as Honoré makes plain, what underlies these rights is possession. You 
cannot sell a thing or profit from it to the exclusion of others unless you possess it. And 
possession in law ultimately turns on demonstrating control. 
The same can be said about contemporary slavery. There would be no case to answer over a 
charge of slavery when a manager determines—within the limits of the law—what, where, 
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and how her employees are deployed. This is so because the essential ingredient of 
possession is lacking. Now consider the opposite: the only manner to buy or sell a person is 
through effecting control tantamount to possession as a precondition. That is a banal way of 
saying that, in a typical case of the selling of a slave, the enslaved has been beaten, often 
raped, until he or she can no longer resist being the object of such a transaction. Slavery, after 
all, is not pretty; it is a nasty business where control tantamount to possession is achieved 
through violence. In such instances, personal liberty is lost; the free will of the person has 
been taken away, transferred from the slave to the owner—the slaveholder. Once this is 
achieved, the slave can then be exploited, his or her labour used, his or her sexual autonomy 
disregarded, all at the whim of the person who now possesses the enslaved. 
Slavery in Law and in Fact 
We have already mentioned that in a case of slavery, once someone has established control 
tantamount to possession, they can manage or sell the person controlled. These, along with 
possession, are three prime examples of the exercise of “the powers attaching to the right of 
ownership” which are central to the legal definition of slavery. Further examples of such 
powers are the use, profit, and transfer of a person, as well as the treating of a person as 
though he or she were disposable. This reading is an important breakthrough which gives 
fundamental traction to the law as an anti-slavery tool. Property lawyers recognise that a 
correct reading of the exercise of the powers attaching to the right of ownership speaks to the 
contemporary understanding of what constitutes slavery in fact. Those leading property 
scholars and slavery experts who first sat down together in Italy and later in the United States 
give pay to their reading of the legal definition of slavery by developing the Bellagio–
Harvard Guidelines on the Legal Parameters of Slavery.12 While these guidelines unpack the 
various powers attaching to the right of ownership just mentioned, they recognise 
fundamentally that: 
In cases of slavery, the exercise of “the powers attaching to the right of ownership” should be 
understood as constituting control over a person in such a way as to significantly deprive that 
person of his or her individual liberty, with the intent of exploitation through the use, 
management, profit, transfer or disposal of that person. Usually this exercise will be 
supported by and obtained through means such as violent force, deception and/or coercion. 
From the 1930s until recently, the general outlook towards the legal definition of slavery has 
been a negative one: why it is not applicable to cases of slavery. Spurred on by the 
determination of the High Court of Australia that the legal definition was applicable to 
contemporary cases of de facto slavery, a group of property scholars and experts in slavery 
set about unpacking those powers attaching to the right of ownership. Much to their surprise, 
there is no true gap existing between a legal reading of ownership and the factual 
circumstances of contemporary enslavement. As such, what is left to be done is to harness the 
latent potential of the accepted definition of slavery and simply hold people responsible for 
enslaving others. 
The neo-abolitionist era holds out this promise, as states are in the midst of moving from 
having slavery on the books to dealing with slavery in the courtroom. For many countries, 
this is novel. With no established jurisprudence in the area and having to rely, in the main, on 
constitutional provisions which simply read, “No one shall be subject to slavery”, judges and 
prosecutors will need to seek to understand what, in law, slavery means. Inevitably, they will 
look to the definition established in international law. In coming together and developing the 
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Bellagio–Harvard Guidelines on the Legal Parameters of Slavery, we have provided an 
internally consistent reading of that definition within its property paradigm that 
fundamentally reflects the lived experience of contemporary slaves. As such, we provide the 
most coherent reading of the legal definition of slavery, one that gets us beyond the dilemma 
of having to choose between the legal definition and a definition which reflects reality. As a 
result, the definition provides the type of legal certainty which is fundamental to any 
prosecution of contemporary slavery: within an ordinary reading of its terms, based as it is on 
a property paradigm, it captures the factual reality of slavery. 
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